Balkanblog

Oliver Basille, über die mangelhafte Presse Freiheit in Albanien

2012-02-02T12:44:00.000-08:00

Olivier Basille, ist der zuständige Mann in der EU, für "Freie Medien", und Medien Freiheit. In einem Artikel bei der Deutschen Welle, wir erneut Albanien kritisiert, was in der Statistik 16 Plätze verlor, für eine freie Presse. Auch der Journalist Fatos Mahmutaj, kommt zu Worte, auf den am 21. Januar 2011 gezielt geschossen wurde und der deshalb in Belgien Politischen Asyl erhielt.

In Albanien geht es in allen Bereichen bergab, was ein "Faile State" ist, wo willkürliche, korrupte und inkompetente Richter, machen was sie wollen, was erneut der Sache: Naum Dishio, ein Vertreter der Griechischen Minderheit die EU beschäftigt.

29.01.2012Basille: I pamundur anëtarësimi në BE me gjendjen aktuale të lirisë së shtypit në Shqipëri

Reporterëve pa Kufij: Politika e ka bërë censusrën të ligjshme në Shqipëri. Oliver Basille, nga kjo organizatë, thotë për DW, se për BE-në një shtyp i lirë është shumë i rëndësishëm.

Në raportin aktual mbi Indeksin e Lirisë së Shtypit për vitin 2011 Shqipëria, në krahasim me vitin 2010, ka bërë një regres prej 16-të vendesh në klasifikimin e publikuar nga organizata Reporterët pa Kufij. Por çfarë ka ndodhur me median në Shqipëri gjatë vitit 2011 për të sjelllë këtë regres? Olivier Basille, Shefi i Marrdhënieve me Institucionet Europiane pranë Reporterëve pa Kufij, është një njohës i mirë, jo vetëm i rajonit, por edhe i Shqipërisë. Sipas tij problemet kanë qenë të shumta duke nisur që nga kriza politike që sjell pasoja edhe në media, deri tek krimi i orgnazuar.
Media dhe drejtësia
"Nuk mund të flasim për një shtyp të lirë. Numri i gazetarëve të paditur është shtuar ndjeshëm. Politikanët janë bërë shumë të zgjuar. Ata thonë që nuk ka censurë politike në Shqipëri dhe kjo është pjesërisht e vërtetë, sepse ata e kanë bërë censurën të ligjshme. Politika thotë se nuk ka burg për gazetarët, por gjykatat vendosin gjoba shumë të larta, që është e pamundur për t'i paguar. Duke qenë se gazetarët në Shqipëri janë të pambrojtur, ata e rrisin nivelin e autocensurës dhe nuk ivestigojnë, sepse e dinë që do të paditen dhe do të humbasin përpara drejtësisë. Kështu që për shumë çështje nuk shkruajnë, nuk investigojnë dhe shumë informacione mbeten në errësirë, " thotë Basille në intervistën për Deutsche Welle-n (DW).
Olivier Basille, Olivier Basille, Shefi i Marrdhënieve me Institucionet Europiane pranë Reporterëve pa Kufij
Ai thekson se censura është bërë e ligjshme në Shqipëri, sepse në të shumtën e rasteve gazetarët kanë humbur gjyqet dhe ky është një mesazh i qartë se nëse ti shkruan për një gjë, do të paditesh dhe do të humbasësh para drejtësisë. "Sistemi i drejtësisë është gjithnjë e më shumë i komplikuar dhe kundër lirisë së informacionit."
Një problem i tillë në median shqiptare e thekson edhe nga Kryetari i Unionit të Gazetarëve Shqiptarë, Aleksandër Çipa. Ai shprehet për Deutsche Welle se proceset gjyqësore ndaj gazetarëve dy vitet e fundit janë shtuar së tepërmi. "Në dy vitet e fundit janë shtuar shumë proceset gjyqësore ndaj gazetarëve. Vazhdojnë në një maratonë të përhershme dhe kjo ndikon negativisht tek puna e gazetarit. Në këto procese kërkohet penalitet financiar i gazetarit me shuma marramendëse, aq sa ata marrin për 10 vjet punë. Proceset ndaj gazetarëve nuk duhet të shëndërrohen në pengesë për mision e tij."
Për Olivier Basille, në këtë pikë hyn në "lojë" edhe krimi i organizuar, që sipas tij në Shqipëri ka shumë ndikim në media. "Gazetarët nuk janë në gjendie të paguajnë mijra e mijra euro dhe më pas duhet t'i drejtohen dikujt për të siguruar këto para. Kjo është mënyra se si krimi i organizuar hyn në media, sepse ata janë të vetmit që mund të paguajnë. Ajo që na shqetëson në Shqipëri është krimi i organizuar, që fiton akoma më shumë fuqi. Ky problem nuk është vetëm në Shqipëri, por edhe në Bullgari, Mal të Zi, Serbi e Kosovë. Ata njerëz kanë paratë dhe fitojnë gjithnjë e më shumë fuqi mbi median," thotë Basille.
Mahmutaj: Nuk mund të thuhet se në Shqipëri ka fjalë të lirë
Gazetari Fatos Mahmutaj
Gazetari shqiptar Fatos Mahmutaj ka mbuluar për 14 vjet çështjet e drejtësisë në media të ndryshme, por sipas tij sot nuk mund të thuhet se në Shqipëri ka fjalë të lirë.
Ai është njëri prej të plagosurve gjatë protestës së opozitës më 21 janar 2011 në Tiranë. Në çastin që ndodhej në detyrë duke raportuar mbi ngjarjen, ai mori një plumb në dorën e djathtë. Sot ai ka një vit që është azilant politik në Belgjikë, sepse Shipëria nuk ishte më një vend i sigurtë për të. Në një intervistë për Deutsche Welle ai tregon se çfarë ndodhi atë ditë dhe cilat qenë pasojat. "Unë u qëllova nga ushtarët e Gardës së Republikës së Shqipërisë, por një gjë e tillë nuk mu lejua ta thoja në median ku punoja edhe pse kam shkuar i gjakosur në redaksi. U detyrova të largohesha nga ai televizion. Ato që unë pashë atë ditë dhe atë se çfarë më ndodhi e tregova gjatë një interviste në një televizion tjetër dhe aty nisën problemet. Dy ditë më pas më kanë kërcënuar me jetë duke më thënë se isha duke folur shumë. Pas kësaj situate ku mu rrezikua jeta, vendosa të ikja menjëherë nga Shqipëria sepse nuk isha më i sigurtë," tregon ai. "E vërteta është gjëja më me vlerë për mua. Nuk jam pishman për vuajtjet që jam duke kaluar larg familjes dhe larg 14 viteve investim në profesionin tim. I marr përsipër rreziqet dhe së vërtetës nuk i ndahem, gjë që duhet ta bëjnë edhe shumë kolegë në Shqipëri", nënvizon Mahmutaj.
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http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15700980,00.html

February 2, 2012

The European Parliament, raises the issue of Naum Dishio

"Challenges and illegal practices of the Albanian authorities against the Greek minority in Albania to put his question to the European Commission" declared MEP Giorgos Koumoutsakos.

The story, was denounces by the Greek MEP Georgeos Koumoutsakos, in European Parliament declared that " On Friday, January 27, 2012, a group of men of Albanian police, violating every concept of rule of law, without falling arrest Prosecutors violently invaded and covered persons in the residence of the President of the minority organization" Omonia". for the Region of Korca and Vice Politic Party "National Greek Minority in the Future (MEGA), Mr. Nahum Ntiso. Indeed caused serious damage within the house. " "These facts," adds Mr. Koumoutsakos, "then became a clearly unfounded accusations of alleged" desecration of graves "in Korca Bompostitsa-which is a deliberate distortion of facts, which have nothing to do with the fabricated charges against the Greek origin Albanian citizen, Nahum Ntiso. "
As noted by SW MEP, the case Ntiso is the latest episode in a series actions of the Albanian authorities against the Greek minority, such as those experienced during the recent inventory process Census. Notes indeed, that such practices by the Albanian authorities apply primarily to areas of the Albanian state refuses to recognize the existence of Greek National Minority (for example regions of Korca, Premetis, Leskoviki, Himara etc.).

On this basis, the European Commission asks it is aware of these facts and if it considers that Albania, which seeks to be a candidate for EU accession country, meets the criteria for full respect for human rights and to protect the rights of Minorities.

Georg Tenet: “it would be disastrous for Greece, Turkey and NATO if war broke out due to escalation of the [Imia] incident”

2012-01-31T14:06:00.000-08:00

Review: Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent

January 30, 2012

Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent. Estimating the Turkish Threat- Crises, Leadership and Strategic Analysis, 1974-1996
By Panagiotis Dimitrakis
University of Plymouth Press (2010), 224 pp.
Reviewed by Chris Deliso
This comparative analytical work discusses two memorable showdowns between Greece and Turkey, events that exemplified both countries’ balance of power and political and military strategic capacities and goals in the late 20^th-century. These affairs – the first, a war of words accompanied by military buildups in 1987 and the second, the much more serious Imia crisis of January 1996 – occurred in an environment in which some of the same conditions that applied then apply still now.
Analysts will thus find a wealth of useful insight in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent, which will help in assessing the Greek-Turkish relationship today. The book is, of course, also an engrossing read for the armchair historian or intelligence buff. The vivid recounting of the decision-making processes of Greek leaders, civilian and military intelligence, and the armed forces (particularly the Navy) is peppered with new commentary from former high-level officials who were active during the period in question, adding to the book’s appeal.
Introduction
The author, Greek historian Panagiotis Dimitrakis, starts his study with an introduction discussing themes like ‘key concepts in military intelligence,’ ‘leadership and intelligence’ and ‘intelligence and crisis management.’ This is a rather theoretical approach, but unquestionably it elucidates topics that are crucial to the narrative of both the 1987 and 1996 events, and thus informs the rest of the text.
The introduction also gives a broad overview of the following six chapters which constitute the bulk of Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent. Readers are thus made aware from the beginning of the overarching structure of the narrative, which fleshes out the concepts discussed in the introduction. Thus the book is of value both in the specific context of Greece and Turkey in the late 20^th century, and in the general context of military intelligence and diplomacy at work. Conclusions can thus be applied or at least compared to other similar situations from elsewhere in the world. Indeed, the forward to Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent is written by Sir Lawrence Freedman, Britain’s Official Historian of the Falklands War.
Historical Context: the Importance of Cyprus, the Continental Shelf and Diplomatic Projections
Dimitrakis illustrates from early on the importance Greek military planners gave to specific formative events and to political/diplomatic issues that posed the risk, in their view, of a violent confrontation. The former was of course the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, creating a military occupation that still shows no signs of ending today. The latter refers to diplomatically disputed issues in the eastern Aegean, chiefly concerning the validity of territorial waters as compared to the extent of islands and coastline, as well as the continental shelf. Both Greece and Turkey have made claims for what they believe to be their rightful property based on differing interpretations of the international laws, agreements and principles relating to this issue.
The Cyprus debacle deeply affected Greek military planners. It proved, for the first time, that NATO ally Turkey was prepared to violently take over a Greek-populated country, and could reasonably expect to survive whatever diplomatic fallout such a daring deed might cause. The events of summer 1974 also caught the Greeks totally by surprise. This was an embarrassment of the highest order, and it meant that in future Greek planners considered it necessary to expect large-scale problems, a view that in hindsight led them to incorrectly estimate the nature of Turkish small-scale, ‘surprise attack’ hostile action in 1996.
However, by and large the intelligence assessments (and particularly from the civilian National Intelligence Service) were that Turkey merely sought to make low-level provocations in order to force Greece into bilateral negotiations over ownership of Aegean islands and economic rights, in particular, drilling for offshore oil. Confident that its case was legal and just, and having evidence even from Turkish maps indicating that they had long before accepted the ‘Greekness’ of certain disputed isles, Athens offered several times to resolve the issue according to the verdict of the International Court of Justice. However, Turkey always refused, often resorting to force to advance its territorial ambitions.
Technical Observations and Dogfights
One enduring aspect of this has been the sometimes fatal dogfights between Greek and Turkish pilots that still occur regularly over the Eastern Aegean. The author provides very solid information on the actual technical factors involved in Greek-Turkish military antagonisms. For example, regarding dogfights, he explains how Greek military intelligence estimates evolved over time, from the early 1980s, when Turkish pilots were considered to be mostly below average and not a threat, to the early 1990s, when they began flying in whole squadrons over multiple points simultaneously.
Aware of the gap, Turkish military planners had increased training, which notably involved participation in Israeli and American exercises. Thus “the Greek interception success rate decreased to 60%, compared to the 98% of the mid-1980s” (p. 94). Once again illustrating the shaping factor of Cyprus was the fact that Turkish airspace violations only became truly “massive” following the Greece-Cyprus Joint Defense Space Doctrine of 1993.
Assessing Hostile Intent
A key aspect of the book is its discussion throughout of Greek security planners’ understanding of Turkish intentions, on both the political and the military level. The author notes that “Greek intelligence had to assess the wording of hundreds of seemingly aggressive public statements and articles by Ankara’s active and retired politicians as well as by its military and diplomatic personnel and to try and make some real sense out of them” (p. 82). This led on occasion to some exaggerations, particularly in the more heated moments between the two countries, but findings from other, secret intelligence often balanced these views.
The cumulative assessment of Turkey’s likely military actions depended on factors such as arms procurement programs, force deployment, violation of Greek air and sea space and hostile propaganda from Turkish officials or media. The likelihood of military adventurism tended to be pointed out by the military, but downplayed by the civilian intelligence officers and diplomats, something that is probably true in most countries.
Indeed, Dimitrakis quotes a former NIS officer who stated in the early 1980s that although Turkey had real offensive capabilities, it did not intend to use them “despite the high nationalist and semi-fascist rhetoric of Turkish politicians and generals” (p. 86). There was a sentiment that NATO or the US would step in at the last minute of any conflict, thus leading to an estimation based on Turkish reaction to any crisis, “and not on the hypothesis of a strategic surprise” (p. 86). This belief would be proven incorrect in 1996, when Turkish commandos briefly occupied the uninhabited Greek islet of Imia.
The Role of Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy
Another of the historic Greek intelligence estimates was that Turkey’s internal politics often dictated its rhetoric and military footing against Greece. By 1991, Prime Minister Turgut Özal was calling for a foreign policy akin to a “New Ottoman Empire” and “claimed that the Dodecanese should not have been called ‘Greek’ but ‘Aegean’ islands” (p. 100). The construction of new military bases on the Aegean coast opposite Greece seemed to confirm the Greek military’s suspicions over such rhetoric. However, at the same time it appeared that the Turks’ desire to preserve good relations with Washington would prevent them from provoking a serious conflict.
One galvanizing factor (again, dating to the 1974 Cyprus experience) was the temporary imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey as a form of punishment for the invasion. Ankara attributed this to the power of the Greek-American lobby, and thus during the 1980s and particularly the 1990s built up a lobby of its own that today is possibly the second-most powerful in the US, after that of Israel. The embargo also led to a policy in Ankara to gain military superiority as soon as possible, and to develop an internal industry of its own. Both were to happen. As the author notes, “from 1992-1996, Turkey was second only to Saudi Arabia in arms procurement and first among the NATO countries (p. 83).”
The internal political factors that Greece perceived to be a threat included the Kurdish insurgency, which Turkey believed Athens to be supporting. But the major internal issue that the author notes is the animosity between the nationalist regime of Tansu Çiller, Turkey’s first female prime minister, and her Islamist adversary, Necmettin Erbakan. On December 24, 1995, Çiller won re-election and, seeking to build a coalition that did not include his Islamist Welfare Party, turned up the volume on the “Islamist threat” to the traditional secular state, while murky conspiracy theories were spread that Greece had a secret plan to divide Turkey. During this period of political gamesmanship, a crisis situation was being prepared that might popularize the prime minister and the military, with Greece as the target.
The 1987 Incident and the Imia Crisis of 1996: Fundamental Differences
Although both major incidents recounted in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent are too complex to be fully discussed, a basic outline of the differences between them can be presented. The first, in March 1987, was largely a war of words that began when Turkish exploratory vessels, escorted by warships, conducted ‘scientific work’ in international waters, but also circled several Greek islands very far from Turkey. Such a provocation had occurred previously, in 1976, when Athens perceived it to have been meant to damage Greek EEC ambitions, while in 1987 it came as a direct response to Greek plans for oil drilling with a US company, Denison.
While the author devotes considerable attention to the tactical and strategic intelligence work that helped Greek planners get through the crisis, he also notes the qualities of then-Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who was capable of pleasing the public with speeches condemning Turkey, and the US for allegedly supporting it, while at the same time keeping channels open with Washington, with which he cooperated more often than not. At the same time, his practically authoritarian leadership streamlined the decision-making process, making disagreement and failures in the chain of command less likely than in a more democratic regime.
By contrast, the political setting for the Imia crisis came when Papandreou was on his deathbed and considerable infighting between prospective PASOK successors was gong on. The new prime minister, Costas Simitis, was frequently not informed on time of key developments in the crisis and was distracted by party leadership battles. Further, Simitis seemed to have suspicions of his own intelligence officials, which sometimes manifested in disinterest or just discounting of advice. He was thus caught by surprise when events overtook him, unlike Papandreou.
Without central leadership, Greek reactions became more susceptible to intelligence failures, which were exacerbated by weather and other tactical conditions affecting the timely flow of information. Following a war of rhetoric and flag-planting on the uninhabited islets of Imia, the Greek government was thus surprised when Turkish commandos occupied one of the islands, considerably upping the ante. (However, the author notes cryptically that a Greek-American lobbyist, perhaps informed by US intelligence, had accurately predicted the hour and place of the landing).
Another key difference, on the tactical level, between 1987 and 1996 was weather conditions. In the latter case, this hampered accurate intelligence collection and communications for both countries and thus knowledge of what was going on in ‘the field.’ An example of Dimitrakis’ depth of detail in providing context for this is his technical discussion of typical geographic, climatic and sea conditions that tend to effect SIGINT technology in the Eastern Aegean. Such background information gives the reader a better appreciation of the operative conditions.
The 1996 incident reinforced Greek suspicions that Turkey was following a strategy of exploiting ‘grey zones,’ maritime areas where the ownership of similar islets could be questioned, and by force if necessary. This seemed to be confirmed when Omer Akbel, MFA spokesman, stated that the Imia example could be extended to “hundreds of little islands, islets and rocks” the status of which remained unclear due to the lack of a supposedly necessary “bilateral agreement.” A few days later, on February 3, outgoing Prime Minister Çiller (who had failed to form a government) raised this number to 1,000 islands and rocks that Turkey should claim.
Another part of the reason why a hostile confrontation was not expected, and definitely not from Europe, was that it had partially been caused by morbid Turkish suspicions that an innocuous EU conservation project in the Eastern Aegean islands was really a covert means of advancing Greek and European interests against Turkey. For intelligence prediction in general, this reaffirms the need to consider local realities and mentalities in assessing possible triggers: in this case, the chronic Turkish tendency to indulge in dark conspiracy theories was forgotten, with unfortunate results.
As in 1987, Turkish actions in 1996 resulted in a massive naval mobilization from the Greek side, and the media in both countries increasingly whipped up a frenzy, making it harder for diplomacy to succeed. The tense standoff was only resolved due to heavy US pressure on both sides, after President Clinton was made to realize that the future of NATO and the whole Western alliance system was in jeopardy.
Indeed, on January 30, Prime Minister Simitis was handed, but “seemed uninterested” in, a personal letter from CIA Director George Tenet. It had been passed on to NIS Director Leonidas Vasikiopoulos from the Athens CIA station chief. The letter stated Tenet’s view that “it would be disastrous for Greece, Turkey and NATO if war broke out due to escalation of the [Imia] incident” (p. 159).
Conclusions: Applicability for Today’s Situation

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