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Donnerstag, 9. Februar 2012

Der Terroristen Banditen Häuptling Salih Berisha, offeriert nun für 100.000 € Albanische Pässe der Internationalen Mafia und Terroristen erneut

Alte Geschäfte, sollte man wieder beleben, denn für eine normale Staats Führung, sind die Albaner Politiker zu dumm, dreist und primitiv kriminell. Also wird jedem Banditen und Verbrecher, der Albanische Pass versprochen und Immunität sowieso!

Giving of Albanian citizenship, the Himara Region, posing risks by ethno cultural assimilation

International Mafia, have more easier to formally pay 100 thousand euros, to be placed "de facto" in Himara Region




Balkan Mafia: Salih Berisha, offeriert Albanische Pässe für die Internationale Mafia" >
Capo Balkan Mafia: Salih Berisha, offeriert Albanische Pässe für die Internationale Mafia Nichts Neues, rund um den Pass und Idenditäten Verkauf der Albanischen Mafia, was sich dort Politiker und Regierung nennt, seit über 15 Jahren Idenditäten Verkauf, inklusive an Bin Laden und Co. ein altes Thema der Banditen Regierung in Tirana. Das Albanische Gesetz, rund um die Albanische Staats Bürgerschaft von 1998, wo tatsächlich den wenigen damals seriösen Investoren praktisch die Staats Bürgerschaft geschenckt wurde (+ Kolumbianischen Drogen Händlern und Islamischen Terroristen), aber mit Sicherheit nicht für lumpige 100.000 €! 1995 und danach verkaufte Salih Berisha schon der Moslem Bruderschaft aus Ägypten, direkten Islamischen Terroristen, die Albanische Staatsbürgerschaft, wo Etliche Bankkonten und Investitionen später ab 2002 beschlagnahmt wurden, mit Hilfe der Amerikaner. Einer war Yassin Kadi, der auch Haupt Anteil Eigner der 2 blauen Hochhäuser gegenüber dem Sitz des PM in Tirana war.Die Islamische Bank, musste in Tirana, deshalb ebenso den Namen wechseln. Die NATO musste ja den Zugang zu den Geheimnissen u.a. der Operationen ändern, weil die Salih Berisha Regierung, die NATO Geheimniss-text-size-ae auch an Islamische Terroristen verkaufte und nicht nur Waffen u.a. an die Hisbollah.
Der Langzeit Kenner von Albanien, gibt hier eine klare Antwort: Nur Verrückte, können in Albanien leben und das ist die Meinung, der wenigen Investoren, welche noch übrig sind ebenso! Einfach zu blöde zum arbeiten, mit Null Bildung, weil die Intelligenz, ab 1997 auch noch auswanderte. Idioten und Kriminelle werden Polizei Direktoren, Präfekte, Minister und Richter!
Dr Geheimdienst warnt erneut, vor diesen Geldwäsche Geschäften, der Internationalen Mafia in Albanien.
Die Warnungen aus 2010, des Geheimdienstes, vor Geldwäsche Projekten, praktisch immer mit gefälschten Papieren der Internationalen Mafia, wie es dann auch kam.
Robert Elsie: If I would live in Albania, it would be crazy   Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Robert Elsie: If I would live in Albania, it would be crazy. It is the same as in Ottoman times

Zeitgleich sollen im Null Funktion Staat Albanien, die Migranten der Albaner, auch noch Steuer Erklärungen abgeben: Tax for Albanian emigrants Investoren Terrorismus ein Standard Programm im Lande, der Banditen und ohne Justiz und Funktion der Polizei. Jetzt versucht man sein Banditen Konzept schneller auszubauen. Die Banditen Regierung Salih Berisha - Ilir Meta, wo keine Verträge gelten, erhält keine Kredite der Weltbank, weil die Regierung zu unzuverlässig ist und nach 2 Wochen wurden die Verhandlungen auch mit der Ost-Europa Bank abgebrochen, über einen Kredit mit 300 Millionen €!Ein Land ohne Gesetze, Null Bau Gesetze und Grundstücks Räubereien wie bei den Taliban und Hunnen. Für 100.000 € erhält jeder Verbrecher, der auf der Interpol Liste steht, einen Albanische Pass, natürlich mit geänderten Idenditäts Merkmalen, was ziemlich einfach ist und eine Standard Prozedur. Die Kosovo Mafia war schon da und ist mit neuen Identitäten schon abgereist. Einige wurden schon in Deutschland enttarnt, vor allem von der Rosenheimer Schleier Fahndung.
Spezialität in Albanien ist: Ein Bandit wird hingerichtet und die Presse outet dann, immer den aktuellen Namen und den Namen, wo er auf der Fahnungs Liste des FBI, Interpol, BKA und Co. steht.
option=com_content&view=article&id=13043:berisha-any-foreign-citizen-who-invests-100-000-euros-in-albania-is-eligible-to-citizenship&catid=240:lajmi-2-home&Itemid=466" style="color: #cc0000; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: underline;">Berisha: Any foreign citizen who invests 100 000 Euros in Albania is eligible to citizenship
7.2.2012: Capo Balkan Mafia: Salih Berisha, offeriert Albanische Pässe für die Internationale Mafia

Dienstag, 7. Februar 2012

Albanians Öl Industrie - Albania Oil Industry Enjoys Revival

Albania Oil Industry Enjoys Revival, but Investor-Government Relations Remain a Question
February 5, 2012
Balkanalysis.com Editor’s Note: recent tales of tattooed and muscle-bound Western oil workers laboring in coastal oil fields, while expressionless men in dark suits and sunglasses stand watch for trespassers, only piques existing interest in Albania’s revitalized energy sector and goings-on there. In the followingBalkanalysis.com special report – which discusses the major players involved, legal issues and technical data  –  readers get an inside view into an important emerging trend with regional implications for economy and possibly political life.
With additional contribution from Ioannis Michaletos in Athens and Stavros Markos in Tirana
The last few years has seen considerable foreign investment in Albania’s oil sector, a trend that is increasing and that involves not only onshore, but also offshore and refinery investment. Much of what is happening in this lucrative industry remains opaque, however, and issues such as privatization practices have been politicized.
The fossil fuels industry has a long history in Albania, where bitumen was mined in Roman times. Modern oil extraction started in the 1930s and, despite that Albania never became a global oil producer, reached production levels by the 1970s that made the country one of the main Balkan oil producers for a time.
However, plagued by inefficient management and obsolete technologies, Albania’s oil production declined and was on the brink of extinction in the post-independence 1990s transition period. However, in the last seven or eight years, the Albanian oil sector has been revived by foreign oil and gas companies looking to invest. While the major deals are involving onshore oil, other foreign investors have recently entered the game for offshore finds, though decisions are being delayed as the players consider proposed EU regulations which would have an impact on offshore drilling.
Albania is thus now looking at the prospect of becoming once again self-sufficient over the next 3-5 years, by eliminating the need for oil imports. And it could even find a new vocation as a small regional oil exporter, though this is not yet a done deal. Further, international watchdogs and investors are on the lookout for any signs of corruption or problematic dealings with governmental authorities, something that in the Balkans is a chronic issue.
From Boom to Bust
During Roman times, the region near Vlore in southern Albania was the center of significant bitumen extraction activity. Modern oil exploration and extraction started during World War I and, in 1928-1929, significant oil fields were discovered. These were the Kuçova field and part of what is now known as the Patos-Marinza field; today this is one of the largest onshore oilfields in Europe.
Mussolini was tempted by Albania’s oil resources and the refinery in Cerrik, near Elbasan in the south, was built during the Italian occupation in WWII. After the war, the Soviet Union also became interested in Albania’s oil resources, and developed a dominant role in the country’s oil sector.
Following the severance of diplomatic and commercial ties with the Soviet Union by dictator Enver Hoxha, China took the lead in the country’s oil sector and supported Albanian efforts- achieving a peak production of almost 43,000 barrels per day (bpd) or 2.2 million tonnes per year. This production level was enough to cover domestic consumption needs, and freed up some crude volumes for export.
However, in 1978 Albania broke off diplomatic relations with China too, and local oil production entered into a seemingly terminal decline. In the 1980s, the petroleum and bitumen sector was still employing 10% of the Albanian workforce, but its share of the national industrial production declined from 8.1% in 1980 to 5% in 1985, and even less than that at the end of the decade.
Oil sector growth was restricted by factors like obsolete technology that reduced oil field production yields, a lack of exploration to replace produced reserves, a lack of investment in extraction equipment and a very limited and aging transportation and refining infrastructure.
By 1990, oil production was down to 23,500 bpd (or 1.2 million tonnes/year).The breaking down of the Communist regime and its ‘central-planning’ economic system at the beginning of the 1990s worsened the oil sector’s problems. It was being run on autopilot by the national oil company (known as the DPNG until 1992 and Albpetrol after that), and oil production from the existing and aging low-recovery yield wells reached less than 9,500 bpd (or 475,000 tonnes/year) in 1994 [PDF]. No bottom was in sight and the entire Albanian oil sector seemed on the brink of extinction.
Factors: Known Reserves, Unknown Reserves, and the Difference for Investment
So far, Albania has not seen any investment from the oil majors. Rather, the players involved are small companies, some appearing to have been set up specifically for operations there.
To some extent, this is how the oil and gas industry works. Oil and gas supermajors, such as ExxonMobile, Royal Dutch Shell and BP tend to be on the lookout for those smaller companies that have already found oil and gas reserves, to renew their own oil and gas reserves.
For their own exploration activities, the supermajors usually focus on established production regions, where, even if they drill a new well, discovery chances are higher than in an unknown region where proven reserves are limited or non-existent. Thus regions like West Africa, the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico take precedent over newcomers like Albania, Greenland, Suriname/French Guyana and the Falklands.
These unexplored new regions thus become niche markets for small players. Since the risks are huge, they have to focus their efforts, and usually on only one region. In fact, many small players disappear because they drill three or four wells, that turn out to be dry. Of course, if they hit pay dirt, the result is different.
The strategy of many of these companies, not unlike that of internet start-ups, is actually thus to find oil and gas and then be acquired by a major. This is the next step once a new production region is opened; the oil majors and supermajors will arrive in a second wave. In a recent example from the Balkans, in Romania’s Black Sea, Sterling Resources and other “small fish” spent almost two decades doing the groundwork, and now ExxonMobil is currently drilling offshore, with Petrom (OMV).
In the case of Albania, it is not yet clear whether the majors will arrive, which is not necessarily a bad thing, so long as those who participate abide by the law and pay their dues to the state.
Auspicious Developments: the Petroleum Law and PSC Definitions
On the legislative side, however, things have started to change for the better. They process actually began in the mid-1990s; in 1993, a Petroleum Law was adopted and amended in 1994 (and yet again in 2008) to create a legal framework for the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons in Albania.
According to the Petroleum Law, the Albanian state, which owns all the oil and gas reserves in the country and is represented by the National Agency of Natural Resources (AKBN) can enter into Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) with state or private companies. These PSCs give exclusive rights to the state’s partner to explore and produce oil and gas in a defined perimeter for 25 years (five additional years can be added to the PSC if the partnership is successful).

Gibt es gigantische Öl Verräte in Albanien

 Eine logische Erklärung und auch Türkische, Slowenische Firmen wie die OMV bohrte schon in Albanien und auch in der Küste davor schon in 1996! Aber man sollte damit vorsichtig sein, denn oft ist es ein PR Trick, für die Börse und Boni für Manager. Fakt ist, das schon vor 15 Jahren die Deutsche Firma Wintershall die Qualität des geförderten Öls untersuchte und es als Minderwertig einstufte, wegen dem hohen Schwefel Gehalt.
Undiscovered Equities Offers Free Trial Subscription Identifying Europe’s Next Giant Oil Play, Manas Petroleum (OTCBB: MNAP) Undiscovered Equities is a leading provider of equity research on high impact oil and gas exploration projects. For more information please see www.undiscoveredequities.com.
Baar, Switzerland (Vocus/PRWEB ) September 15, 2009 - Manas Petroleum (OTCBB: MNAP)

Die US Mafia mit Frank Wisner, Patton Bogg’s foreign affairs advisor - Alb Petrol


update zum 26.11.2011 und 27.11.2011 weil diese CIA Ganoven und Consults, sehr einfältige und dumme Leute sind.
Frank Wisner mit seiner Firma Patton Boogs ist ein Sonderfall an krimineller Dummheit des CIA, und im Gefolge die ganzen Ja-Sager der NATO und EU Politik. Verstand braucht man ja nicht in der Politik, noch beim Militär. siehe der Kriegs Treiber und Ober Dummi, Georg Tenet, oder gar der Geschäftemacher Richard Holbrook, der schon entsorgt wurde, als Partner des Frank Wisner.
Die MEICO Waffen Lieferungen an die Hisbolla gegen Drogen und die Folgen: viele CIA Spione verhaftet und ermordet
Waffen gegen Drogen: 12 CIA Agenten wurden im Iran festgenommen, welche aus Albanien Waffen besorgten
Frank Wisner, der Welt Drogen Boss Nr. 1 und uralt Profi Verbrecher, ist praktisch der Lehrmeister der NATO, weil Alle nur nachplabbern was der Verbrecher wünscht. Jetzt ist die Firma des Frank Wisner auch für die Privatisierung  von Albpetrol (Rezart Taci Mafia)auch noch beauftragt, die entgültig privatisiert wurde. Da sollte man wissen, das für Salih Berisha, diese Öl Firma schon vor 18 Jahren, u.a. mit Hilfe eines Österreicher, sehr erfolgreich Öl verschob und Treibstoff im Auftrage des Salih Berisha, während des UN Embargos an die Serben lieferte. (siehe Agron Musaraj, oder auch der heutige Minister Fatmir Mediu)! Auch gegen den US Senator Eliot Engel, rund um Geldwäsche und Drogen Handel, ermittelt das FBI und Interpol inzwischen und gegen die hoch kriminellen Familien Bytyci, Sahit Muja, Bajraktari.
Ein besonders kritischer Brief von Gary Kokolary, der eine Legende ist, als echter Albaner Lobbyist (Ausnahmsweise in positiven Sinn) an Frank Wisner, wo er nach seinen Provisionen gefragt wird, rund um die Albpetrol Privatisierung.
Kokalari: Uisner, shpjego rolin e dyshimtë të “Patton” në privatizimet e dyshimta të Berishës!

Montag, 6. Februar 2012

EU - Report: Agrar Böden und Produkte des Kosovo sind vergiftet

Wer dafür verantwortlich ist, wäre ebenso festzustellen, denn diese Zustände gibt es erst seit 1999, wo wohl Chemie Geschäfte Macher auch aus Deutschland, jedes Gift vertrieben u.a. von Bayer! Unqualifzierte Personen wurden als Vertriebs Partner angeheuert, mit Duldung der UNMIK und vor allem der Deutschen. siehe Zustände in Albanien in 1994, wo man Albaner u.a. nach Tutzing einlud.

Kosovo's land poisoned?
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Kosovo's land poisoned?
The Kosovo Minister of Agriculture, Blerand Staliveci, reacted after some media articles said that the agricultural land in Kosovo is poisoned and that the consumption of agricultural products presents a real danger for life, by rejecting these voices. 

“The consumption of fruits, vegetables, meat and other products, including dairy, could result even with death”.

This was the conclusion of a European Commission report, published by Express Newspaper in Prishtina. It also says that the agricultural land is contaminated with metals such as chrome, nickel, lead, zinc and arsenic.

The high concentration of these pollution elements seems to be all over Kosovo. Syzana Bytyci, from the European Commission Information OFfice, declared for Top Channel that this study has not analyzed the effect of these substances in the food chain. The EU will assist in another detailed study, in order to be clear about the potential effecta.

The Minister of Agriculture, Blerand Stavileci, declared for Top Channel that this study is not based on scientific grounds, and hence, it is not valid. 

Minister Stavileci says that the fertile land of Kosovo is healthy and that the producers from Kosovo make regular analysis for this.

The Minister advised the citizens to consume local goods, because they are not harmful and there is nothing to be worried about.


Toka e helmuar
Sipas një raporti të Komisionit Europian, toka e bukës në Kosovë është e helmuar dhe konsumimi i produkteve bujqësore të vendit, paraqet rrezik real për jetën e kosovarëve. Dokumentet që ka siguruar Gazeta Express, tregojnë se si qytetarët që ushqehen me frutat, perimet, mishin apo produktet e qumështit, rrezikohen në shkallë të lartë edhe nga vdekja.
Produktet bujqësore që kultivohen në Kosovë po del se janë shumë të rrezikshme.
Madje konsumi i frutave, perimeve, mishit apo produkteve të qumështit, përfshirë qumështin, gjalpin e djathin me të cilat ushqehen qytetarët, mund të rezultojnë edhe me vdekje.
Kështu ka konstatuar Raporti i Komisionit Europian (EULUP) - “Përkrahja e mëtejme e shfrytëzimit të tokës”, të cilin e ka siguruar Gazeta Express.
Ky raport hulumtues mbi ndotjen e tokës bujqësore, është përfunduar në janar të këtij viti nën mbikëqyrjen e Profesorit Wolfgang Spyra.
Të gjeturat nga analizat e bëra janë alarmante sa që rekomandohet sa më parë këto fakte të verifikohen dhe të përcillen me hulumtime shkencore për të evituar trazirat e mundshme sociale.
EULUP ka dëshmuar kontaminimin e tokës bujqësore, mbi normat e lejuara, me metale të rënda, në veçanti krom, nikel, plumb, zink dhe arsenik. Koncentrimi i lartë i këtyre ndotësve thuhet se është në të gjithë Kosovën.
“Sipërfaqet e ndotura përdoren për prodhimin e produkteve bujqësore që përdoren në zinxhirin ushqimor njerëzor. Këto produkte bujqësore është e mundur të përmbajnë këso ndotës që mund të kenë efekt negativ, të cilat në fund rezultojnë me vdekje”, thuhet në raport.
Të dhënat e gjetura tregojnë se burimi më i madh i ndotjes së tokës bujqësore vjen nga mihjet e qymyrit, mineralet metalike, shfrytëzimi industrial i tokës dhe ndotja e bimëve nga ujërat e lumenjve dhe mbetjet nga përmbytjet vjetore.
Një tjetër aspekt i ndotjes së tokës bujqësore përmendet se vjen nga rrjedhat e ujërave të deponive të mbeturinave, si dhe nga mungesa e trajtimit të ujërave nga industritë e mëdha.
EULUP konstaton se në Kosovë lumenjtë dhe rrjedhat zakonisht përdoren si deponi bërlloku, uji i të cilëve shfrytëzohet për ujitje të tokave. Kjo praktikë vlerësohet si një shprehi e keqe që ndikon në masë të madhe në ndotjen e tokës në Kosovë.
“Varësisht prej llojeve të bimëve bujqësore që rriten në hapësirën e kontaminuar, ndotësit do të transferohen në biomasën e bimës në shkallë të ulët apo të lartë. Në veçanti metalet e rënda, ndotësit më shqetësues në Kosovë, mund të transferohen direkt në biomasën e bimëve”, thuhet në raport.
Për këtë arsye, sipas të gjeturave, është e pritshme që perimet dhe frutat e rritur në tokën bujqësore në Kosovë do të përmbajnë metale të rënda ashtu sikur edhe ushqimi i bagëtive nga këto produkte bujqësore apo kullota në tokat bujqësore.
Bazuar në rezultatet e projektit, fuqimisht rekomandohet të hetohen produktet si patatet, karotat, marullat, piperi, domatet dhe kastravecët në lidhje me koncentrimin e metaleve të rënda dhe ndotësve të tjerë. Gjithashtu, ushqimi i bagëtive, mishi dhe produktet e qumështit kërkohet të investigohen për koncentrim të ndotësve relevantë.
Për shkak të rezultateve alarmuese, një hetim më i detajuar dhe më i thellë për ndotjen e tokës bujqësore vlerësohet si i domosdoshëm.
“Në mënyrë që të parandalohen spekulimet dhe trazirat sociale të popullsisë, këto fakte menjëherë duhet të verifikohen dhe të forcohen me hulumtime shkencore. Projektit të ardhshëm duhet t’i kushtohet vëmendje dhe konfidecialitet për shkak të pasojave që mund të kërcënojnë ekzistencën ekonomike të shumë fermerëve”.
Për shkak të pasojave të rënda që mund të rezultojnë nga një hetim i detajuar i tokës bujqësore dhe një investigim i produkteve bujqësore, konsiderohet i nevojshëm implementimi i një programi për siguri të cilësisë i standardeve të larta.
Por, në raport thuhet se asnjë kompani apo institucion në Kosovë nuk do të jetë në gjendje të implementojë këto projekte pa asistencë profesionale nga jashtë.
http://www.gazetaexpress.com

Sonntag, 5. Februar 2012

Bulgarien und Mazedonien mit den wenigsten Schulden in Europa

 Russland, Weiss Russland, sind vorbildliche Länder, wie man sieht! Warum NATO Länder mit ihren Betrugs Bankern, dann immer ständig Alles besser wissen, da sollte man sich Gedanken machen.
Bulgarien und Mazedonien mit den wenigsten Schulden in Europa Aug 12th, 2011 | von: Aleks | Kategorie: Lead Top Story, Politik Die aktuelle Euro- und Schuldenkrise dominiert die täglichen Nachrichten. Fast jede Woche wird ein EU-Land von einer der drei großen Ratingagenturen heruntergestuft. Mit Griechenland hat es angefangen, Irland, Portugal, Zypern, Italien, Spanien folgten.
Staatsverschuldung Europa 2010 (Quelle:http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/67/Staatsverschuldung_Europa_2010.PNG)
Staatsverschuldung Europa 2010 (Quelle:http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/67/Staatsverschuldung_Europa_2010.PNG)
Ein kleiner Lichtblick scheinen hier die osteuropäischen Staaten zu sein. Russland, Bulgarien und Mazedonien sind hier führend. Sie haben die wenigsten Staatsschulden wie folgende Graphik zeigt. Bulgarien als einigstes EU-Land, neben Luxemburg, und Mazedonien als kleines Balkanland.
Warum haben gerade diese Staaten so wenig Schulden? Werden keine Kredite gewährt? Wie sind die Konditionen? Möglicherweise ist hier etwas dran.
Als Griechenland in die EURO-Zone aufgenommen wurde, veränderte sich das Kreditrating Athens schlagartig. Zuvor war es B, mit dem EURO bekam man sofort das Bestrating, und damit auch einen Zugang zu zinsgünstigen Krediten. Griechenland nahm viele Kredite auf, lebte über den eigenen Verhältnissen, die Wirtschaft wuchs weniger schnell als erwartet. Mit beschönigte, ich möchte nicht sagen gefälschten Statistiken hatte man jahrelang die EU-Bürokraten fern gehalten. Das Ergebnis kennen wir alle.
Die Türkei war Anfang 2000 in einer ernsten Wirtschaftskrise. Hohe Zinsen mussten für Kredite gezahlt werden, kein Wirtschaftswachstum, hohe Arbeitslosigkeit. Als eine von vielen Maßnahmen wertete die Türkei ihre Währung ab - ca. 50%. Dadurch wurde das Land attraktiver für Investoren, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Landes stieg, überholte schnell den Nachbarn Griechenland. Die Exporte schossen in die Höhe. Heute boomt das Land, die Wirtschaft blüht, Fachkräfte sind gefragter denn je, viele Investoren wollen dabei sein.

AMNA / Archbishop Ieronymos of Athens and All Greece on Thursday addressed a letter to Prime Minister Lucas Papademos voicing his strong concern about the situation the country, referring to the "despair", as he said, being experienced by the people who lose their jobs and homes. 揟he phenomenon of the homeless and the famished, a reminder of WWII conditions, has taken the dimensions of a nightmare,� he underlined, adding that 搕he homeless increase by the thousands everyday, while small and medium-sized enterprises are forced to go out of business. Young people, the countr... mehr »

Freitag, 3. Februar 2012

Bosnische Staats Institutionen verpulvern Millionen, für Miet Projekte

Die Methode ist überall identisch, inklusive der Maifiösen PPP Programe in Deutschland! Wo sind nur alle diese früheren Gebäude der Verwaltung, der bosnischen Republik wohl geblieben? 03 Feb 12 / 12:20:15 Bosnia Institutions Spend Millions on Office Rent
Auditors have found that state agencies in Bosnia spend around 15 million euro a year renting office space and apartments.
Elvira Jukic
BIRN
Sarajevo
The audit, adopted by parliament on February 2, was conducted last year and revealed that none of the offices rented are chosen by public procurement rules. Instead most deals are made by negotiating with those who respond to calls advertised in the newspaper.

It also said there are no strict rules on the conditions under which offices can be rented.

The institutions of Bosnia spend around three per cent of their budgets on renting offices, with that amount rising every year as more public workers are employed and new state agencies are funded.

Amounts being spent on rent, and also on parking places, have steadily increased from around seven million euro in 2005.

Most offices are rented in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar with the average space per employee around 17 square meters. The average price per square meter of offices rented is 10-20 euro.

The auditors said that by cutting one square meter per employee, Bosnia could save around 100,000 euro a year and an additional 80,000 euro if rent was lowered by 0.5 euro per square meter.

............

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-state-institutions-spending-millions-on-renting

Donnerstag, 2. Februar 2012

Oliver Basille, über die mangelhafte Presse Freiheit in Albanien

 Olivier Basille, ist der zuständige Mann in der EU, für "Freie Medien", und Medien Freiheit. In einem Artikel bei der Deutschen Welle, wir erneut Albanien kritisiert, was in der Statistik 16 Plätze verlor, für eine freie Presse. Auch der Journalist Fatos Mahmutaj, kommt zu Worte, auf den am 21. Januar 2011 gezielt geschossen wurde und der deshalb in Belgien Politischen Asyl erhielt.

In Albanien geht es in allen Bereichen bergab, was ein "Faile State" ist, wo willkürliche, korrupte und inkompetente Richter, machen was sie wollen, was erneut der Sache: Naum Dishio, ein Vertreter der Griechischen Minderheit die EU beschäftigt.


29.01.2012 Basille: I pamundur anëtarësimi në BE me gjendjen aktuale të lirisë së shtypit në Shqipëri

Reporterëve pa Kufij: Politika e ka bërë censusrën të ligjshme në Shqipëri. Oliver Basille, nga kjo organizatë, thotë për DW, se për BE-në një shtyp i lirë është shumë i rëndësishëm.


Në raportin aktual mbi Indeksin e Lirisë së Shtypit për vitin 2011 Shqipëria, në krahasim me vitin 2010, ka bërë një regres prej 16-të vendesh në klasifikimin e publikuar nga organizata Reporterët pa Kufij. Por çfarë ka ndodhur me median në Shqipëri gjatë vitit 2011 për të sjelllë këtë regres? Olivier Basille, Shefi i Marrdhënieve me Institucionet Europiane pranë Reporterëve pa Kufij, është një njohës i mirë, jo vetëm i rajonit, por edhe i Shqipërisë. Sipas tij problemet kanë qenë të shumta duke nisur që nga kriza politike që sjell pasoja edhe në media, deri tek krimi i orgnazuar.
Media dhe drejtësia
"Nuk mund të flasim për një shtyp të lirë. Numri i gazetarëve të paditur është shtuar ndjeshëm. Politikanët janë bërë shumë të zgjuar. Ata thonë që nuk ka censurë politike në Shqipëri dhe kjo është pjesërisht e vërtetë, sepse ata e kanë bërë censurën të ligjshme. Politika thotë se nuk ka burg për gazetarët, por gjykatat vendosin gjoba shumë të larta, që është e pamundur për t'i paguar. Duke qenë se gazetarët në Shqipëri janë të pambrojtur, ata e rrisin nivelin e autocensurës dhe nuk ivestigojnë, sepse e dinë që do të paditen dhe do të humbasin përpara drejtësisë. Kështu që për shumë çështje nuk shkruajnë, nuk investigojnë dhe shumë informacione mbeten në errësirë, " thotë Basille në intervistën për Deutsche Welle-n (DW).
Olivier Basille, Olivier Basille, Shefi i Marrdhënieve me Institucionet Europiane pranë Reporterëve pa KufijOlivier Basille, Olivier Basille, Shefi i Marrdhënieve me Institucionet Europiane pranë Reporterëve pa Kufij
Ai thekson se censura është bërë e ligjshme në Shqipëri, sepse në të shumtën e rasteve gazetarët kanë humbur gjyqet dhe ky është një mesazh i qartë se nëse ti shkruan për një gjë, do të paditesh dhe do të humbasësh para drejtësisë. "Sistemi i drejtësisë është gjithnjë e më shumë i komplikuar dhe kundër lirisë së informacionit."
Një problem i tillë në median shqiptare e thekson edhe nga Kryetari i Unionit të Gazetarëve Shqiptarë, Aleksandër Çipa. Ai shprehet për Deutsche Welle se proceset gjyqësore ndaj gazetarëve dy vitet e fundit janë shtuar së tepërmi. "Në dy vitet e fundit janë shtuar shumë proceset gjyqësore ndaj gazetarëve. Vazhdojnë në një maratonë të përhershme dhe kjo ndikon negativisht tek puna e gazetarit. Në këto procese kërkohet penalitet financiar i gazetarit me shuma marramendëse, aq sa ata marrin për 10 vjet punë. Proceset ndaj gazetarëve nuk duhet të shëndërrohen në pengesë për mision e tij."
Për Olivier Basille, në këtë pikë hyn në "lojë" edhe krimi i organizuar, që sipas tij në Shqipëri ka shumë ndikim në media. "Gazetarët nuk janë në gjendie të paguajnë mijra e mijra euro dhe më pas duhet t'i drejtohen dikujt për të siguruar këto para. Kjo është mënyra se si krimi i organizuar hyn në media, sepse ata janë të vetmit që mund të paguajnë. Ajo që na shqetëson në Shqipëri është krimi i organizuar, që fiton akoma më shumë fuqi. Ky problem nuk është vetëm në Shqipëri, por edhe në Bullgari, Mal të Zi, Serbi e Kosovë. Ata njerëz kanë paratë dhe fitojnë gjithnjë e më shumë fuqi mbi median," thotë Basille.
Mahmutaj: Nuk mund të thuhet se në Shqipëri ka fjalë të lirë
Gazetari Fatos Mahmutaj Gazetari Fatos Mahmutaj
Gazetari shqiptar Fatos Mahmutaj ka mbuluar për 14 vjet çështjet e drejtësisë në media të ndryshme, por sipas tij sot nuk mund të thuhet se në Shqipëri ka fjalë të lirë.
Ai është njëri prej të plagosurve gjatë protestës së opozitës më 21 janar 2011 në Tiranë. Në çastin që ndodhej në detyrë duke raportuar mbi ngjarjen, ai mori një plumb në dorën e djathtë. Sot ai ka një vit që është azilant politik në Belgjikë, sepse Shipëria nuk ishte më një vend i sigurtë për të. Në një intervistë për Deutsche Welle ai tregon se çfarë ndodhi atë ditë dhe cilat qenë pasojat. "Unë u qëllova nga ushtarët e Gardës së Republikës së Shqipërisë, por një gjë e tillë nuk mu lejua ta thoja në median ku punoja edhe pse kam shkuar i gjakosur në redaksi. U detyrova të largohesha nga ai televizion. Ato që unë pashë atë ditë dhe atë se çfarë më ndodhi e tregova gjatë një interviste në një televizion tjetër dhe aty nisën problemet. Dy ditë më pas më kanë kërcënuar me jetë duke më thënë se isha duke folur shumë. Pas kësaj situate ku mu rrezikua jeta, vendosa të ikja menjëherë nga Shqipëria sepse nuk isha më i sigurtë," tregon ai.  "E vërteta është gjëja më me vlerë për mua. Nuk jam pishman për vuajtjet që jam duke kaluar larg familjes dhe larg 14 viteve investim në profesionin tim. I marr përsipër rreziqet dhe së vërtetës nuk i ndahem, gjë që duhet ta bëjnë edhe shumë kolegë në Shqipëri", nënvizon Mahmutaj.
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http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15700980,00.html

February 2, 2012


The European Parliament, raises the issue of Naum Dishio




"Challenges and illegal practices of the Albanian authorities against the Greek minority in Albania to put his question to the European Commission" declared MEP Giorgos Koumoutsakos.


The story, was denounces by the Greek MEP Georgeos Koumoutsakos, in European Parliament declared that " On Friday, January 27, 2012, a group of men of Albanian police, violating every concept of rule of law, without falling arrest Prosecutors violently invaded and covered persons in the residence of the President of the minority organization" Omonia". for the Region of Korca and Vice Politic Party "National Greek Minority in the Future (MEGA), Mr. Nahum Ntiso. Indeed caused serious damage within the house. " "These facts," adds Mr. Koumoutsakos, "then became a clearly unfounded accusations of alleged" desecration of graves "in Korca Bompostitsa-which is a deliberate distortion of facts, which have nothing to do with the fabricated charges against the Greek origin Albanian citizen, Nahum Ntiso. "
As noted by SW MEP, the case Ntiso is the latest episode in a series actions of the Albanian authorities against the Greek minority, such as those experienced during the recent inventory process Census. Notes indeed, that such practices by the Albanian authorities apply primarily to areas of the Albanian state refuses to recognize the existence of Greek National Minority (for example regions of Korca, Premetis, Leskoviki, Himara etc.).


On this basis, the European Commission asks it is aware of these facts and if it considers that Albania, which seeks to be a candidate for EU accession country, meets the criteria for full respect for human rights and to protect the rights of Minorities.

Dienstag, 31. Januar 2012

Georg Tenet: “it would be disastrous for Greece, Turkey and NATO if war broke out due to escalation of the [Imia] incident”

Review: Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent

January 30, 2012
Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent. Estimating the Turkish Threat- Crises, Leadership and Strategic Analysis, 1974-1996
By Panagiotis Dimitrakis
University of Plymouth Press (2010), 224 pp.
Reviewed by Chris Deliso
This comparative analytical work discusses two memorable showdowns between Greece and Turkey, events that exemplified both countries’ balance of power and political and military strategic capacities and goals in the late 20th-century. These affairs – the first, a war of words accompanied by military buildups in 1987 and the second, the much more serious Imia crisis of January 1996 – occurred in an environment in which some of the same conditions that applied then apply still now.
Analysts will thus find a wealth of useful insight in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent, which will help in assessing the Greek-Turkish relationship today. The book is, of course, also an engrossing read for the armchair historian or intelligence buff. The vivid recounting of the decision-making processes of Greek leaders, civilian and military intelligence, and the armed forces (particularly the Navy) is peppered with new commentary from former high-level officials who were active during the period in question, adding to the book’s appeal.
Introduction
The author, Greek historian Panagiotis Dimitrakis, starts his study with an introduction discussing themes like ‘key concepts in military intelligence,’ ‘leadership and intelligence’ and ‘intelligence and crisis management.’ This is a rather theoretical approach, but unquestionably it elucidates topics that are crucial to the narrative of both the 1987 and 1996 events, and thus informs the rest of the text.
The introduction also gives a broad overview of the following six chapters which constitute the bulk of Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent. Readers are thus made aware from the beginning of the overarching structure of the narrative, which fleshes out the concepts discussed in the introduction. Thus the book is of value both in the specific context of Greece and Turkey in the late 20th century, and in the general context of military intelligence and diplomacy at work. Conclusions can thus be applied or at least compared to other similar situations from elsewhere in the world. Indeed, the forward to Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent is written by Sir Lawrence Freedman, Britain’s Official Historian of the Falklands War.
Historical Context: the Importance of Cyprus, the Continental Shelf and Diplomatic Projections
Dimitrakis illustrates from early on the importance Greek military planners gave to specific formative events and to political/diplomatic issues that posed the risk, in their view, of a violent confrontation. The former was of course the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, creating a military occupation that still shows no signs of ending today. The latter refers to diplomatically disputed issues in the eastern Aegean, chiefly concerning the validity of territorial waters as compared to the extent of islands and coastline, as well as the continental shelf. Both Greece and Turkey have made claims for what they believe to be their rightful property based on differing interpretations of the international laws, agreements and principles relating to this issue.
The Cyprus debacle deeply affected Greek military planners. It proved, for the first time, that NATO ally Turkey was prepared to violently take over a Greek-populated country, and could reasonably expect to survive whatever diplomatic fallout such a daring deed might cause. The events of summer 1974 also caught the Greeks totally by surprise. This was an embarrassment of the highest order, and it meant that in future Greek planners considered it necessary to expect large-scale problems, a view that in hindsight led them to incorrectly estimate the nature of Turkish small-scale, ‘surprise attack’ hostile action in 1996.
However, by and large the intelligence assessments (and particularly from the civilian National Intelligence Service) were that Turkey merely sought to make low-level provocations in order to force Greece into bilateral negotiations over ownership of Aegean islands and economic rights, in particular, drilling for offshore oil. Confident that its case was legal and just, and having evidence even from Turkish maps indicating that they had long before accepted the ‘Greekness’ of certain disputed isles, Athens offered several times to resolve the issue according to the verdict of the International Court of Justice. However, Turkey always refused, often resorting to force to advance its territorial ambitions.
Technical Observations and Dogfights
One enduring aspect of this has been the sometimes fatal dogfights between Greek and Turkish pilots that still occur regularly over the Eastern Aegean. The author provides very solid information on the actual technical factors involved in Greek-Turkish military antagonisms. For example, regarding dogfights, he explains how Greek military intelligence estimates evolved over time, from the early 1980s, when Turkish pilots were considered to be mostly below average and not a threat, to the early 1990s, when they began flying in whole squadrons over multiple points simultaneously.
Aware of the gap, Turkish military planners had increased training, which notably involved participation in Israeli and American exercises. Thus “the Greek interception success rate decreased to 60%, compared to the 98% of the mid-1980s” (p. 94). Once again illustrating the shaping factor of Cyprus was the fact that Turkish airspace violations only became truly “massive” following the Greece-Cyprus Joint Defense Space Doctrine of 1993.
Assessing Hostile Intent
A key aspect of the book is its discussion throughout of Greek security planners’ understanding of Turkish intentions, on both the political and the military level. The author notes that “Greek intelligence had to assess the wording of hundreds of seemingly aggressive public statements and articles by Ankara’s active and retired politicians as well as by its military and diplomatic personnel and to try and make some real sense out of them”  (p. 82). This led on occasion to some exaggerations, particularly in the more heated moments between the two countries, but findings from other, secret intelligence often balanced these views.
The cumulative assessment of Turkey’s likely military actions depended on factors such as arms procurement programs, force deployment, violation of Greek air and sea space and hostile propaganda from Turkish officials or media. The likelihood of military adventurism tended to be pointed out by the military, but downplayed by the civilian intelligence officers and diplomats, something that is probably true in most countries.
Indeed, Dimitrakis quotes a former NIS officer who stated in the early 1980s that although Turkey had real offensive capabilities, it did not intend to use them “despite the high nationalist and semi-fascist rhetoric of Turkish politicians and generals” (p. 86). There was a sentiment that NATO or the US would step in at the last minute of any conflict, thus leading to an estimation based on Turkish reaction to any crisis, “and not on the hypothesis of a strategic surprise” (p. 86). This belief would be proven incorrect in 1996, when Turkish commandos briefly occupied the uninhabited Greek islet of Imia.
The Role of Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy
Another of the historic Greek intelligence estimates was that Turkey’s internal politics often dictated its rhetoric and military footing against Greece. By 1991, Prime Minister Turgut Özal was calling for a foreign policy akin to a “New Ottoman Empire” and “claimed that the Dodecanese should not have been called ‘Greek’ but ‘Aegean’ islands” (p. 100). The construction of new military bases on the Aegean coast opposite Greece seemed to confirm the Greek military’s suspicions over such rhetoric. However, at the same time it appeared that the Turks’ desire to preserve good relations with Washington would prevent them from provoking a serious conflict.
One galvanizing factor (again, dating to the 1974 Cyprus experience) was the temporary imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey as a form of punishment for the invasion. Ankara attributed this to the power of the Greek-American lobby, and thus during the 1980s and particularly the 1990s built up a lobby of its own that today is possibly the second-most powerful in the US, after that of Israel. The embargo also led to a policy in Ankara to gain military superiority as soon as possible, and to develop an internal industry of its own. Both were to happen. As the author notes, “from 1992-1996, Turkey was second only to Saudi Arabia in arms procurement and first among the NATO countries (p. 83).”
The internal political factors that Greece perceived to be a threat included the Kurdish insurgency, which Turkey believed Athens to be supporting. But the major internal issue that the author notes is the animosity between the nationalist regime of Tansu Çiller, Turkey’s first female prime minister, and her Islamist adversary, Necmettin Erbakan. On December 24, 1995, Çiller won re-election and, seeking to build a coalition that did not include his Islamist Welfare Party, turned up the volume on the “Islamist threat” to the traditional secular state, while murky conspiracy theories were spread that Greece had a secret plan to divide Turkey. During this period of political gamesmanship, a crisis situation was being prepared that might popularize the prime minister and the military, with Greece as the target.
The 1987 Incident and the Imia Crisis of 1996: Fundamental Differences
Although both major incidents recounted in Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent are too complex to be fully discussed, a basic outline of the differences between them can be presented. The first, in March 1987, was largely a war of words that began when Turkish exploratory vessels, escorted by warships, conducted ‘scientific work’ in international waters, but also circled several Greek islands very far from Turkey. Such a provocation had occurred previously, in 1976, when Athens perceived it to have been meant to damage Greek EEC ambitions, while in 1987 it came as a direct response to Greek plans for oil drilling with a US company, Denison.
While the author devotes considerable attention to the tactical and strategic intelligence work that helped Greek planners get through the crisis, he also notes the qualities of then-Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who was capable of pleasing the public with speeches condemning Turkey, and the US for allegedly supporting it, while at the same time keeping channels open with Washington, with which he cooperated more often than not. At the same time, his practically authoritarian leadership streamlined the decision-making process, making disagreement and failures in the chain of command less likely than in a more democratic regime.
By contrast, the political setting for the Imia crisis came when Papandreou was on his deathbed and considerable infighting between prospective PASOK successors was gong on. The new prime minister, Costas Simitis, was frequently not informed on time of key developments in the crisis and was distracted by party leadership battles. Further, Simitis seemed to have suspicions of his own intelligence officials, which sometimes manifested in disinterest or just discounting of advice. He was thus caught by surprise when events overtook him, unlike Papandreou.
Without central leadership, Greek reactions became more susceptible to intelligence failures, which were exacerbated by weather and other tactical conditions affecting the timely flow of information. Following a war of rhetoric and flag-planting on the uninhabited islets of Imia, the Greek government was thus surprised when Turkish commandos occupied one of the islands, considerably upping the ante. (However, the author notes cryptically that a Greek-American lobbyist, perhaps informed by US intelligence, had accurately predicted the hour and place of the landing).
Another key difference, on the tactical level, between 1987 and 1996 was weather conditions. In the latter case, this hampered accurate intelligence collection and communications for both countries and thus knowledge of what was going on in ‘the field.’ An example of Dimitrakis’ depth of detail in providing context for this is his technical discussion of typical geographic, climatic and sea conditions that tend to effect SIGINT technology in the Eastern Aegean. Such background information gives the reader a better appreciation of the operative conditions.
The 1996 incident reinforced Greek suspicions that Turkey was following a strategy of exploiting ‘grey zones,’ maritime areas where the ownership of similar islets could be questioned, and by force if necessary. This seemed to be confirmed when Omer Akbel, MFA spokesman, stated that the Imia example could be extended to “hundreds of little islands, islets and rocks” the status of which remained unclear due to the lack of a supposedly necessary “bilateral agreement.” A few days later, on February 3, outgoing Prime Minister Çiller (who had failed to form a government) raised this number to 1,000 islands and rocks that Turkey should claim.
Another part of the reason why a hostile confrontation was not expected, and definitely not from Europe, was that it had partially been caused by morbid Turkish suspicions that an innocuous EU conservation project in the Eastern Aegean islands was really a covert means of advancing Greek and European interests against Turkey. For intelligence prediction in general, this reaffirms the need to consider local realities and mentalities in assessing possible triggers: in this case, the chronic Turkish tendency to indulge in dark conspiracy theories was forgotten, with unfortunate results.
As in 1987, Turkish actions in 1996 resulted in a massive naval mobilization from the Greek side, and the media in both countries increasingly whipped up a frenzy, making it harder for diplomacy to succeed. The tense standoff was only resolved due to heavy US pressure on both sides, after President Clinton was made to realize that the future of NATO and the whole Western alliance system was in jeopardy.
Indeed, on January 30, Prime Minister Simitis was handed, but “seemed uninterested” in, a personal letter from CIA Director George Tenet. It had been passed on to NIS Director Leonidas Vasikiopoulos from the Athens CIA station chief. The letter stated Tenet’s view that “it would be disastrous for Greece, Turkey and NATO if war broke out due to escalation of the [Imia] incident” (p. 159).
Conclusions: Applicability for Today’s Situation

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Click here for Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent on Amazon.com
Click here for Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent on Amazon.co.uk

http://www.balkanalysis.com/greece

Sonntag, 29. Januar 2012

Ali Ahmeti's Banditen aus Lojane, ebenso die Tetova, Kumanova Mafia, als Dirigenten der Schleuser Mafia

Für normale Arbeit, inklusive Adminstrative Aufgaben zu inkompetent, mit diesen gekauften Schulzeungissen, falschen Lehrern und Professoren, macht man halt munter weiter, während Gestalten, wie Mehmud Thaci, Ali Ahmeti und Co. ihre Mafia Geschäfte organisieren, hinter dem Dunst Kreis, von Pararolen wie Demonkratie, Menschenrechte und der Albanischen Mythen Geschichte, welche man sich zusammengelogen hat. Höhepunkt eines primitien Idioten mit direkten Bin Laden Beziehungen: Ali Ahmeti erklärt, das Alexander der Grosse, ein Albaner seit, obwohl damals nicht einmal in Albanien, oder Mazedonien Albaner lebten. Macedonia, Europe's New Transit Country For Illegal Immigrants
Macedonia has become a new transit country for clandestine Afghan and Pakistani immigrants who gather near the Serbian border as they try to find their way into the European Union. Macedonian police turn a blind eye, and humanitarian groups aren't reaching out to help.
Skopsko, Macedonia (keepwaddling1) 
Skopsko, Macedonia (keepwaddling1)

By Jean-Arnault Dérens
LE TEMPS/Worldcrunch
LOJANE – Several dozen young men are basking in the warm mid-day sun. They are Afghan and Pakistani. Behind them, on a white wall, is graffiti extolling the glories of the UÇK -- ex-Kosovo Albanian guerilla fighters.
Over the past two years, the Macedonian village of Lojane, which borders Serbia, has become a stop-over on the illegal migration routes to Western Europe. “It started when groups of three or four would arrive periodically. It didn’t disturb us at first,” says Selam Mehmeti, the head of the village community. “But since this summer, it’s grown to a whole other dimension: there were 500 in November.”
The story these men tell is almost always the same. Khan, a 22-year-old Afghan from Kandahar, travelled through Iran, Turkey and then Greece before arriving in Bitola, Macedonia. He then headed for Lojane so he could get into Serbia. Serbian police have already sent him back to Macedonia twice.
The latest plan is to try to go through Hungary. “After that -- from Austria on -- everything will be fine. I want to go to Paris, where I have friends. The most difficult thing is to get through Serbia.”
The immigrants sleep in the “jungle” – the fields that stretch between Lojane and Miratovac, the nearest village, some three kilometers away. Miratovac is in Serbia, but its population is entirely Albanian. “The border has been closed since 1993,” Blerim, an inhabitant of Lojane, explains. “Traditionally, relations between the two villages have played an important role. Both my mother and my wife come from Miratovac.”
Acting like they don't exist
Where the dirt road abruptly turns to asphalt: this is the only place to demarcate the border line between Macedonia and Serbia. Serbian police and military police are on permanent patrol, and stop anyone who tries to go across, either from Miratovac, or the neighboring town of Presevo. Busloads of illegal immigrants stopped anywhere in Serbia are also sent to Lojane.
All the immigrants say they heard about the village either on the Internet or through friends. But village head Mehmeti says that’s not true: he says well-organized networks wait for the immigrants along the country’s southern borders, at Gevgelija and Bitola, and bring them here. “And the ones that get caught at the Tabanovce border checkpoint, (10 km from the village) come here too.”
There is no visible presence of Macedonian police: the border is guarded only on the Serbian side, villagers say. There are also no humanitarian organizations in Lojane, even though the winter cold is going to make survival conditions for the immigrants that much worse. “Everybody acts as if they don’t exist,” says Mehmeti.
Despite agreements made with the European Union, Serbia and Macedonia are incapable of dealing with the new tide of clandestine immigrants, who are increasingly opting to take this route instead of the heavily monitored road from Greece to Bulgaria to the north. Skopje has only one immigration detention center that no journalists have been able to visit, and that officially just has space for several dozen people.
The village head is pleased: it’s quiet today, there are “only” a few dozen illegal immigrants in Lojane. However, a line of some 15 men can be seen walking through the fields from Tabanovce. A small Macedonian border police patrol watches from the derelict gas pump located halfway between the villages of Lojane and Vaksince. They neither comment, nor pursue the men, but just keep watching instead.
Read the original article in Frenchhttp://www.worldcrunch.com/macedonia-europes-new-transit-country-illegal-immigrants/4316?device=auto


The “Lojane” Albanian primitiv Mafia: now migrant - mafia - before: Terrorist, arms, drugs and nobody is working

Primitiv Bandits of  ”Lojane” in 2001!