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Mittwoch, 19. September 2012

20 Jahre kriminelles Enterprise der Salih Berishia Mafia in Albanien

Der Ex-US Botschafter John Withers, sagte vor wenigen Tagen: Albanien ist wie Libyen, oder Ägypten, was noch sehr vornehm ausgedrückt ist. Salih Berisha Most criminal of the world: Salih Berisha und was der US Professor Shinas Rama, über diesen Banditen Clan sagt. Das Salih Berisha Verbrecher Kartell ( Salih Berisha DP Party Mafia)hier im Focus der Geschichte. Immer die selbe Methoden, Shows für ausländische Beobachter und geheime Anweisungen und Todes Dekrete, was bei den Schulen schon anfing, wo die Lehrer instruiert wurden in 1995, Ausländern Nichts zu Sagen und die Schulkinder mussten das Salih Berisha Bildungs System loben. Heute ist das Bildungs System vollkommen ruiniert, wo ein Rektor an der Tirana Unveristät vor kurzem sagte: die Studenten können nicht einmal einen Satz richtig schreiben. Rrokaj: Studentët nuk dinë më as shqipen bazike 18 Shtator, 2012 CORRUPTION, INCLUDING bribery, thievery, and favors, remains the only way of getting things done in Albania, from paying electricity bills to conducting international relations. Prevalent in all the former communist countries, corruption is having an increasingly harmful effect on young democratic societies, especially in a country as poverty-stricken as Albania. Voters there registered a protest against the raging lawlessness when, at the end of 1994, they defeated a referendum on a new draft constitution. President Sali Berisha admitted that the defeat had less to do with the constitution itself than with the government’s failure to tackle corruption. The exposure of corruption within the ruling Democratic Party (PD) seems to have weakened it and has also put Berisha’s political standing in question. The 6 November defeat of the new draft constitution caused some to suggest that Berisha may not survive his full four-year presidential term, which runs through March 1996. When Berisha was elected president of Albania in 1992, following almost 50 years of communist dictatorship, one of his first moves was to declare war on corruption. Although apparently sincere in calling it Albania’s greatest enemy, Berisha has not managed to stem the rising tide of corruption. Consequently, the population has become disheartened; it appears to many that little has changed in the shift from communism to democracy. That disillusionment - felt sharply by the poor, who bear the brunt of economic reform’s “shock therapy” - turned to anger when the Berisha government failed to go to battle. To the poor, democracy and free-market ideals mean little; they have seen only a new group fattened by privilege and wealth gained through corruption. The referendum gave the poor a voice, and they in turn gave the government a loud “no.” The PD, unable to offer another explanation for the defeat, sprang into action to fight corruption. THE OPPOSITION’S EXPLOITATION The opposition, led by the powerful Socialist Party (PS), took advantage of the referendum by turning corruption into a major political issue. The PS is usually quick to exploit for its benefit the Democrats’ political setbacks, but the corruption issue is slightly different. The roots of Albanian corruption are traceable both to the communist era and to the brief period under socialist rule that ended in March 1992. The Socialists, even though their own record regarding corruption is far from clean, are aiming their propaganda guns at the issue in an effort to regain power. The Democrats responded to Socialist attacks by going on the offensive themselves. An article in Rilindja Demokratike, which is run by the PD, berated the “social-communists” for belittling the fight against corruption.1 The daily reported that the Socialists “played the political scene with the card of corruption in the same way they had previously done with the card of class struggle.” The Democrats defended themselves in the article by pointing to some figures in the war against corruption: the State Control Commission fined 510 people a total of 7,713 million lek ($85.7 million), indicted 367 people, and took administrative measures against another 17,177 officials and civil servants. Some say those figures, however, do not paint a true picture. The State Control Commission is accused of failing to act on several cases of blatant corruption. For example, miners at Albania’s largest chrome mine, in Bulqize, staged a hunger strike in late January 1995 to demand the dismissal of the mine director, who they claimed was abusing his power. The commission investigated the mines and reportedly discovered evidence of “large-scale corruption.”2 It supposedly requested the dismissal of the director and the head of the local branch of the Finance Ministry, but no action was taken on that request. That was further evidence of the pervasiveness of corruption, which appears to reach to the highest levels of government, despite constant pledges that it is being fought. The Democrats do not seem to grasp the fact that the population tends to forget or ignore the past and instead concentrate on current events in their lives. This is even more true now, when the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” is steadily widening and some of the democratic newcomers are becoming visibly richer through their new connections. The Democrats had promised a better life for all and not just for a few; many Albanians are now bitter with resentment. Time may show that Berisha is badly mistaken in his belief that Albania will not follow some other formerly communist countries in bringing socialists back to power. He has said that Albania’s particularly harsh, Stalinist brand of communism makes a return of socialists to power impossible. However, it is possible that the frustration caused by social injustice and corruption could prompt voters to return former communists to rule as they have done in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. It has become the Democrats’ custom to explain and justify the country’s many unsolved problems by blaming them all on 50 years of radical communism . While Berisha could be correct in pointing to communism as the root of corruption, placing the sole blame there does not seem to be the right approach. The people are simply tired of listening to the same refrain, which becomes even less convincing when many in central and local government seem only to grow in power or wealth. BERISHA’S LONELY BATTLE President Berisha has been waging the campaign against corruption almost single-handedly. He continues to live modestly, remaining in the same small apartment where he lived before he became president. (He is known, however, to have a penchant for nice clothes.) Observers of the Albanian scene say Berisha is one of the few politicians who have not become rich through political circumstance. But although he stands as a lonely and pious example, Berisha has limited himself to rhetoric, not attempting to tear out the roots of corruption or to fight it within his party and government. When the Albanian voters rejected’the draft constitution, Berisha immediately acknowledged the result as a protest against government inefficiency and corruption, and he praised the people for having shown their anger “in an admirable, democratic manner.”3 At his year-end press conference in late December, he tried to explain the phenomenon of corruption: “Corruption is one of communism’s most bitter legacies; it experienced a great leap forward during the final days of the dictatorship and unfortunately has passed on to the post-dictatorship period. It we look back four or five years, no Albanian could get a refrigerator or a television without first paying for authorization - not to mention getting a job or something else. This unfortunately has remained to this day. Corruption is a serious problem in all newly democratic societies. It is one of the most disturbing problems and must be fought more resolutely.”4 —– 1 Rilindja Demokratike, 28 December 1994. 2 ASD, 3 February 1995. 3 Rilindja Demokratike, 8 November 1994. 4 Rilindja Demakratike, 29 December 1994. The defeat of the referendum had several repercussions. On 4 December 1994, Berisha reshuffled the cabinet, a move that will very likely be followed by other high-level realignments throughout 1995 in anticipation of the national elections, expected in 1996. Although some of the ministers in question were not specifically fired on corruption charges, it was clear that they had been cast from their posts precisely for that reason. Even under the present conditions of democracy, corruption remains as much a way of life in Albania as it was under communism. As Berisha noted, in the past, no one could buy major appliances without a bribe: today, no one can even pay bills for water, electricity, or other services without first bribing an official. To get decent medical care, either private or state-supported, people must pay substantial bribes.5 While some consider this merely an aberration - an irritation of living in present-day Albania - it nevertheless causes great frustration. But far more serious is the corruption at the highest levels of power and administration, which has caused even more bitterness and anger. HIGH-LEVEL ACCUSATIONS The political climate in Albania has become heated over the last few months. The government prosecuted many cases both directly and indirectly related to corruption, all in an arena of open media. The press freely reported and commented on the various scandals, bringing the issue into the public eye. It was during this time that a case referred to as the “Arsidi scandal” returned to court. Former Prime Minister Vilson Ahmeti was tried for the second time, together with former Trade Bank director Agron Saliu and his deputy Agim Tartari, for misappropriating $1.2 million. They allegedly paid that money in 1991 to Nicola Arsidi, a French citizen who was authorized by previous and present administrations to negotiate forgiveness of Albania’s foreign debt (which is estimated to be more than $1.1 billion.)6 Those government leaders had already been sentenced to between two and seven years in prison on the charges, but their appeal to a higher court won them a retrial on the basis of new evidence. That new evidence also implicated former National Bank governor Ilir Hoti and another former Trade Bank director, Ardian Xhyheri. The government has also accused former Deputy Prime Minister Rexhep Uka and former Finance Minister Gene Ruli of abuse of office and corruption in connection with the export of walnut wood by the timber company Elbasan. Former Trade Minister Artan Hoxha was also accused of abusing his position. Ruli and Uka are presently parliament deputies, and on 16 March, legislators voted 63 to 44 against lifting their immunity.7 The 29-year-old Hoxha is currently in Italy doing postgraduate work. Former Transport and Communications Minister Fatos Bitincka and Albert Gajo, an adviser to Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, have also been accused of falsifying documents and abusing their power.8 In mid-January, the state prosecuted an Albanian legislator for the first time - Democrat Arben Lika, who was charged with cigarette smuggling. That trial, which Supreme Court Chief Justice Zef Brozi is presiding over, has been covered extensively by the press. At least one reporter has written that “the trial may be problematic for many of Lika’s former colleagues, meaning that they might be involved in their own shady dealings. When five PD deputies demanded in January that the chief justice’s immunity be lifted so he could be arrested for abusing his power, the news hit the country like a bolt of lightning. Brozi, a PD member, had been nominated by Berisha as chief justice in an effort to stamp out corruption in the judiciary. Rumor had it that Brozi felt betrayed and abandoned by the president. Some PD deputies reportedly wanted him out because he insisted on prosecuting those guilty of corruption, regardless of party affiliation. The five deputies accused Brozi of illegally approving an early release from jail of a Greek citizen convicted on drug charges. The accusation, however, was clearly politically motivated. Brozi publicly denied any wrongdoing, saying, ‘The record of my struggle against corruption in Albania precludes the possibility of me being corrupt.”10 In fact, Brozi has won high praise for his fight to keep Albania’s courts independent and free from the dictates of politics. He claims - and many believe him - that some corrupt, high-ranking Democrats who fear judicial independence are bent on destroying him. The clash between Brozi and Minister of Internal Affairs Agron Musaraj - whom Brozi has accused of ”directing a mafia network and employing despotic methods against arrested people” - is also interesting in this context.11 On 1 February, the Albanian parliament voted 53 to 49 not to lift Brozi’s immunity. The decision was seen as a smashing victory for the chief justice and another political setback for the PD.12 Brozi said after the vote, “The era when votes were dictated has been replaced by an era when everyone can vote according to his own conviction and conscience.” Brozi also thanked journalists for their support.13 The Brozi case clearly displays the internal battles and divisions within the PD, likely caused by widespread corruption at the highest seats of power, that sooner or later arc bound to wreak political havoc. The incident, however, could positively affect President Berisha’s political fortunes if he can muster enough strength and support from the party to disable the politically and economically corrupt, as he did with the cabinet reshuffle in December. PARTY SPLIT? In addition to the falling electoral support manifested by the referendum defeat, Berisha could be equally threatened by a potential split within his party. The close parliamentary vote against lifting Brozi’s immunity is an indication that members have different agendas. Another sign is the sacking of PD leader Eduard Selami at an extraordinary party congress on 5 March, when 607 of the 664 participants voted against him in an open ballot. That was in the wake of Selami’s threat in late January to resign and his subsequent demand that the constitution be adopted by parliament instead of through a referendum. Selami said the party chief should also be prime minister, a statement interpreted as an effort to unseat Meksi, the present government leader. He also said the government was making a mistake by “not listening to the voice of the party,” adding that there was a “gap between the government and the PD, and the government in power must carry out the party’s policies.”14 All these developments are in one way or another related to the disease of corruption plaguing the country. A rift appears to have divided the party into two main groups: the forces fighting the party’s involvement in corruption, and those who are now trying to survive accusations. Whatever happens, there is relatively little time left before the scheduled national elections in 1996, and this period will be a trying time for Berisha. If the Democratic Party - or whatever is left of it - fails to reinvig-orate itself under Berisha’s charismatic leadership, it could prove disastrous for the president’s political future. —– 5 Interviews by the author in Albania. 6 Gazeta Shqiptare and Aleanca, 10 January 1995. 7 Gazeta Shqiptare, 17 March 1995. 8 Koha Jone, 30 December 1994. 9 Populli Po, 12 January 1995. 10 Zeri, 18 January 1995. 11 Koha, 11 January 1995. 12 Gazeta Shqiptare, 2 February 1995. 13 Rilindja, 4 February 1995. 14 Gazeta Shqiptare, 31 January 1995. http://www.tol.org/client/article/3069-albania Fun Facts About Our New Allies [2] The Progressive Review (Washington), 22 June 1999 “Albania … offered NATO and the U.S. an important military outpost in the turbulent southern Balkans (in the 1990-96 period Albania opened its ports and airstrips for U.S. military use and housed CIA spy planes for flights over Bosnia)…. The U.S. played a major role in the DP’s 1992 electoral victory, and it then provided the new government with military, economic, and political support. In the 1991-96 period Washington directly provided Albania $236 million in economic aid, making the U.S. the second largest bilateral economic donor (following Italy)…..Following Berisha’s visit to the U.S. in March 1991, Washington began supplying direct assistance to the DP, including donations of computers and cars for the 1992 electoral campaign. William Ryerson, the first U.S. ambassador, stood next to Berisha on the podium at election rallies. The U.S. failed to criticize, and at times encouraged, the new president as he purged critics of his policies within the judicial system, police, and the DP—often through illegal means. By 1993 DP loyalists and family members held most of the prominent positions in Albania’s ministries, institutes, universities, and state media. Citing the threat of communism’s return, Berisha successfully instilled fear in the population and discredited his rivals. The U.S. embassy in Albania contributed to the polarization of Albanian politics by refusing to meet most of the opposition parties (former communists as well as others) for the first two years of DP rule. This one-sided view of democratization helped Berisha dismantle most political alternatives, some of which were moderate and truly democratic.

Uwe. G. Kranz, Ltd. Ministerialrat, Organisierte Kriminalität und Terrorismus – eine kritisch

Europäischer Polizeikongress, Berlin,14.02.2007, http://www.euro-police.com/pdf/kranz_2007.pdf

 

Adriatik Kelmendi, Prostitution Racket Flourishes, Balkan Crisis Report, http://iwpr.net/?apc_state=hsqfbcr157963&l=en&s=f&o=157965

Der Ja-Sager Präsident Bujar Nishani, der mit Vorsatz die Justiz und Polizei zerstörte - nun gibt es Entführungen in Tirana

Neuer UN secret Bericht aus 2003, wo es um die Kindes Entführungen geht, zur Organ Entnahme und die enge Zusammenarbeit mit dem Verbrecher Kartell aus Tropoje: Salih Berisha, was ja wie heute bewiesen ist, auch direkt in die Todes Schwadronen rund um die Rugova Morde, mit Xhavit Halili, Hashim Thaci, Ferdinand Xhaferie und dem wohl vom CIA ermordeten damaligen US Botschafter Josef Limprecht verwickelt sind (Mitte Mai 2002), der ja eine Legende ist, für seine Bin Laden, Terroristen Verbindungen, inklusive Morde und Chef des wohl grössten Drogen Ringes in Albanien.


……………………………

Yassin Kadi, der Bin Laden Financier und die Albaner UCK - KLA Terroristen



Xhavit Halili, Xhaferi, und Berisha, hatten ein Treffen in 1998, wie hier dokumentiert. Man kannte sich bestens.

fatosklosibinladen0002hr0.jpg

Albanian Secret Service Chief Fatos Klosi in 16.5.1998 in der “Albania” durch den Albanischen Geheimdienst Chef Fatos Klosi: KLA (UCK) is financed by Bin Laden

Xhavit Halili, Hashim Thaci und die Fatos Nano und Berisha Mafia

UCK - KLA killer swadron

300 Nah-Ost Terroristen und Islamische Terroristen, waren in Nord Albanien unterwegs und sind noch heute Ehrengäste im Kosovo. der spiegel brachte auch hier den Artikel.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily | Mar.17,2004 | Gregory R. Copley,
Editor,
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
Volume XXII, No. 50 Friday, March 19, 2004
© 2004, Global Information System, ISSA
Exclusive Special Report
“During the first half of August 2003, 300 Albanian-trained guerillas
— including appr. 10 mujahedin (non-Balkan Muslims) — were
infiltrated across the Albanian border into Kosovo, where many have
subsequently been seen in the company (and homes) of members of the
so-called Kosovo Protection Corps which was created out of Kosovo
Albanian elements originally part of the KLA. In fact, the Kosovo
Protection Force seems almost synonymous with the Albanian National
Army (ANA), the new designation for the KLA. The guerillas were
trained in three camps inside the Albanian border at the towns of
Bajram Curi, Tropoja and Kuks, where the camps have been in operation
since 1997.”
……….
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1100906/posts Bin Laden, Geldwäsche und die Amerikaner haben damit kein Problem im Balkan, wo als auch noch der Drogen- und Waffen Schmuggler des US Botschafter Josef Limprecht publik wurde, der Botschafter Mitte Mai 2002 eliminiert wurde. Diese zeigen, dass Albanien ist sicherlich nicht ein eklatantes Beispiel der Demokratie. Mit Berisha hat Albanien getan weniger als einen Zustand Gangster als Regierung verkleidet und Sie schulden ihnen Amerikaner und Albaner, um diese Situation zu verbessern. Der AAEF, verkaufte illegal Grundstücke in Albanien und organisierte dies mit der American Bank of Albania (einer Gründung des CIA finanzierten AAEF, welche auch als Geldwäsche Stelle für Internationale Terroristen wie einem Yassin Kadi - Bin Laden Financier arbeitete, siehe auch der [15] Terrorist Abdul Latif Saleh - Damir Fazllic - Salih Berisha // als Partner Wesley Clark)! Im Februar 2012, wird der Jordanier [16] Hamze Abu Rajan (Hamzeh Abu Rayan) zu 4 Jahren Haft verurteilt, als Ex-Manager der Yassin Kadi Firma: Loxhall Sh.P.K. ) Damit haben die Amerikaner automatisch, die Verantwortung, von fast 10.000 Blutrache Morden (50% direkt rund um Grundstücke, die illegal besetzt und bebaut wurden. [17] Der Albanian AmericanEnterprise Fund, verkaufte wie hier mit einem Foto aus 2001 bewiesen ist, iillegal Gewerbe Grundstücke direkt an der Autobahn Durres- Tirana! Eine der verrückten Geheimdienst Ideen, das man erst Grundstücke besetzt, bebaut und dann verkauft und später irgendwann legalisiert, was besonders gut links und rechts an der Autobahn Durres-Tirana zusehen ist. Gescäftsmodell Geldwäsche, Betrug und Grundstücksraub, was ein Terroristischer Angriff gegen die Bevölkerung ist. Null Allgemeinbildung bekanntlich, und lt. Auskunft von Geheimdienst Direktoren, sind diese CIA Dumm Gestalten rund um Georg Tenet ziemlich einfältig und haben obtruse Ideen. Etliche dieser illegalen Grundstückes Verkäufe, beschäftigen inzwischen den Eurpäischen Gerichtshof, weil die Ilir Meta Mafia Regierung und Fatos Nano, gemeinssame Sache mit dieser US Verbrecher Organisation machten. Der AAEF organsierte damals auch die Versteigerung geklauter Luxus Autos im Hote Dajti in Tirana und die Typen fuhren mit Jeeps vor, welche die Botschafts Auto Nr. 23—- hatten. [18] Albanian American Enterprise Fund - AAEF und seine Mafia GeschäfteMontag, 12. Dezember 2011

Capo der primitiv Terroristen und Mafia Clans aus Tropoje hat einen Schlag Anfall erlitten: Salih Berisha

 

Inzwischen hat der primitive Verbrecher Salih Berisha wohl gestern einen Schlag Anfall erlitten. Was kaum bekannt ist, das die NATO Sicherheits Maßnahmen getroffen hat, die Waffen Lager zusichern, denn bei der primitiven Gestalt eines kriminellen Idioten Clans des Salih Berisha ist Alles möglich, das dieser Neanderthaler Europas, nochmal die Plünderung der Militär Depots, wie in 1997 organisiert, für seine Tropoje Banditen Clans! NATO takes under control, entire arsenal of Albanian army Während einer Rede, zum Jahres Tag, der Gründung der PD Partei vor 21 Jahren, wo er seine Rede nicht mehr beenden konnte. Aufällig sind die vielen neuen Gesichter um den antiken Verbrecher, weil die besseren Leute der Partei, sich längst von diesem Verbrecher distanziert haben und er nur noch von Vertretern der kriminellsten Clans umgeben ist. viele neue Gesichter um Salih Berisha, der mangels Intelligenz nur eine Marionette einer primitiv kriminellen Kaste der Albaner Mafia ist. Für diese Bande, gilt kein Gesetz und die Tropoje Berufs Verbrecher POlizei Spitze ist ihr Partner, wie die korrupten Staatsanwälte und Richter. Man konnte live seit langem miterleben, das Salih Berisha leichte Lähmungs Erscheinungen hatte und ebenso Geh Probleme. Das er unter dem Einfluss von Medikamenten steht, weiss sowieso jeder. Ein willfähriges Opfer, einer kriminellen Kaste, welche sich um ihn geschart hat, was man ja in 1996 auch schon erleben konnte. Alle Fehler wurden vor 10 Jahren mit den Albanern gemacht, aber vor allem die kriminelle Orgie mit dem Kosovo Krieg, obwohl die echte einheimische Bevölkerung in Albanien, dagegen war, diese kriminellen Bastarde zu unterstützen. Bestens in 1997, 1998 bekannt, die Todesschwadronen der Kosovo Mafia in Albanien und ihre Plünderungs Feldzüge in alter Tradition (Report von Wolf Ochlies), nach Albanien. Zu lange hat man ein Auge zugedrückt, wollte auch Nichts wissen, von den Verbrechen des Salih Berisha, Ilir Meta, oder der primitiven Kosovo Banditen Clans, die sich biometrische Pässe, wie ebenso Terroristen in Albanien besorgt haben. Auffällig im Verbrecher System des Salih Berisha: 2010 / 2011, die identischen Methoden, das man Kriminelle und Islamische Terroristen mit neuen Idenditäten und Pässen (Freie Fahrt nach Europa), ausstattet und dies die Geschäfte Grundlage des Verbrecher Kartelles des Salih Berisha Clans ist. Hier tobt Salih Berisha herum, gegen seinen heutigen Partner und beschuldigt ihn Recht in 2001: des Drogen- Waffen- Frauen Handels und des Betruges. Salih Berisha Stile, denn seine Leute, betrieben ja vom Organ- Kinder- Drogen- Frauen Handel absolut Alles bis heute. Eines der damaligen typischen Ablenkungs Manövers, des Salih Berisha Verbrecher Kartells. 1997-98: in einem Report aus 2011 For the CIA, politics was secondary to the business of providing security. In June and July 1998, several months before the operation documented in Spycraft, two raids on foreign extremists were conducted with the help of the SHIK and Albanian police. According to a subsequent Washington Post investigation of August 12, 1998, these raids netted “…a bag of faked documents and official Albanian government stamps needed to get past customs and police checkpoints [and] certify legal documents” at the home of a foreign “religious scholar,” Maged Mostafa. For the CIA, a prime security danger in Albania had always involved forgery and misappropriation of official identity documents, and these developments only reinforced this understanding. http://www.balkanalysis.com/albania/2011/02/04Tropoje is a good place to observe how effective Albania’s ex-President Sali Berisha, a local boy made good, has been in rallying the KLA. During last year’s rebellion—which eventually forced him out of office—he used supporters from his home region to fend off the protests against his rule, which were strongest in southern Albania. Members of the Berisha entourage have resurfaced in and around Tropoje, wearing smart KLA uniforms and brandishing well-polished rifles. Near Mr Berisha’s home, in an even tinier settlement than Tropoje, a placard improbably proclaims the KLA’s “headquarters”. Whereas the current Albanian government has tried, with diminishing success, to keep some distance from the KLA, Mr Berisha has organised pro-KLA rallies in Tirana, Albania’s capital. http://www.economist.com/node/134665

20 Jahre Staats Terror der Salih Berisha Bande: Der neue Report des US Department of State Report

Gary Kokalari: Er nennt Salih Berisha: einen gnadenlosen, pathologischer Lügner! Berisha Gaddafi Berisha, 100 mal schlimmer als Gaddafi Ein vollkommen verrottetes System, von kriminellen Clans, die Stroh dumm sind und extrem kriminell. Viel schlimmer, als jeder Mubarak, Saddam, oder gar ein Gaddafi, der dem Volk Kostenfreie Schulen und Krankenhäuser ermöglichte, wie Zinsfreie Existenz Gründungs Darlehen. The new US Statedepartment Report: US Statedepartment – 2011 Human Rights Report – Albania (May 24, 2012) Albanian a joking court and justiz system: “Many judges issue rulings that do not appear to have any basis in law or fact, leading some to believe that the only plausible explanation is corruption or political pressure.”

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